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Abstract
Do firms displace labor with new information technologies such as “artificial intelligence”?
It is challenging to distinguish the effects of technology adoption from unobserved
productivity and demand shocks. We take a first look at the economic impacts of large
custom software investment —“IT spikes”—using a novel methodology to obtain
consistent estimates. Following these events, firm employment increases by about 7% and
revenues by about 11%. Rather than displace labor, IT spikes increase revenues and
markups, implying decreased labor share of output. Moreover, growth is greater for firms
that use AI, IT-producing firms, newer firms, and those in the trade, service, and financial
sectors.

JEL Codes: D22, J21, O33
Keywords: information technology, artificial intelligence, employment growth, firm growth,
labor share, markups
This paper is a major revision of a working paper titled “Shocking Technology: What
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the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Google.org, and Schmidt Futures. The contents
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Introduction
What happens to employment when firms adopt major new technologies? Concerns
about job losses have been heightened as new digital technologies ranging from robotics to
machine learning and other forms of artificial intelligence are being adopted across many
sectors of the economy. Following Frey and Osborne (2017), over 18 recent studies predict
job losses from new automation technologies, including some predictions of massive job
losses (Winick 2018). These studies are based on presumed occupational exposure to
automation. Beginning with Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), a large literature has explored
how occupational characteristics make certain jobs more “automatable.” However, just
because certain jobs may be more automatable does not mean that firms will adopt a new
technology or that its adoption will displace workers in these jobs.
If workers in automatable occupations are being replaced by new technology, we
should see the clearest evidence of this in studies of firm or establishment data.1 However,
firm-level measures of technology adoption are difficult to obtain for large representative
samples of firms.2 Following Bessen et al. (2019), a number of studies have sought new
sources of data that identify discrete adoption events in broad populations of firms. 3 For
reasons we discuss below, major new technologies are often adopted in “lumpy” investment
episodes. These discrete events help isolate the impact of technology adoption from other

A number of studies have looked at the impact of robots at a more aggregate level, including Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2020), Graetz and Michaels (2018) and Dauth et al. (2017). Of course, the effect of new technology
on firm employment can be different from the aggregate effect, but firm level analysis should nevertheless
most clearly reveal the displacement of workers.
1

Some studies have explored specific natural economic experiments, but these measure effects only for limited
samples. Akerman et al. (2015) study broadband rollout in Norway; Gaggl and Wright (2018) use a tax
incentive in the UK that affected small businesses.
2

Acemoglu, Lelarge, and Restrepo (2020); Aghion et al. (2020); Bessen et al. (2020); Bonfiglioli et al. (2020);
Domini et al. (2019); Humlum (2019); Koch et al. (2019).
3
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changes using difference-in-differences designs. However, these designs do not fully control
for the endogeneity of adoption. For instance, adoption might be correlated with
unobserved productivity or demand shocks that also affect labor demand, thus biasing
estimates.
This paper proposes to understand the impact of technology adoption by
considering the structural relationship between labor demand and the production function.
There are two benefits from modeling labor demand this way. First, the production function
literature has well-established techniques for estimating unobserved productivity and
demand shocks using control functions. We incorporate these estimates in our difference-indifferences labor demand equation, thus controlling for the most likely sources of
endogeneity bias. Second, our labor demand equation helps distinguish different margins
along which a major new technology affects labor demand. Specifically, a new technology
can replace workers with machines (displacement effect), it can increase productivity, and it
can increase markups, especially if the new technology is proprietary. Each of these margins
affects employment and also other outcomes such as the labor share of output. While
displacement decreases employment, all else equal, growth in productivity or markups can
increase employment.
We apply this empirical approach to study the firm-level impact of major
investments in proprietary information technology among firms listed publicly in the US. We
identify adoption events by major increases in firm employment of software developers (“IT
spikes”) and estimate the effect of these events on labor and revenue with a difference-indifferences design. We find these events are followed by increases in firm (non-IT)
employment of about 7% and increases in revenue of about 11%, after controlling for timeinvariant unobserved heterogeneity among firms as well as unobserved productivity and
3
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demand shocks. These results are robust to controlling for shocks common to all firms in an
industry, using only the subsamples of firms that experience an IT spike for the analysis or
dropping firms that experience multiple IT spikes, alternative definitions of an IT spike,
excluding firm-years in the tails of the distribution of labor or revenue growth, and
controlling for factors that vary over time such as the number of mergers and acquisitions of
a company and expenses in adverting and research and development.
Moreover, an event-study analysis shows that, before the IT spikes, the trends in
labor and revenue for firms “treated” by the IT spikes are similar to those of “control”
firms, and there is a gradual increase in both outcomes starting in the year of the IT spike.
This suggests that our difference-in-differences estimates of the positive effects of the IT
spikes are not due to pre-trends.
Exploring the sources of increased employment, we find no significant displacement
of workers by capital, a small effect of productivity on employment, and most of the
increase appears related to increases in markups. The latter might not be surprising
considering that these investments in own-developed software are proprietary and thus
might generate rents.
Finally, we explore the heterogeneous impacts of these adoption events. We find that
job growth is greater in firms that use AI, IT producing firms, in firms headquartered in the
US, in young firms, at the beginning of our sample period, and in firms in the trade,
financial, and service sectors.
An emerging literature uses technology adoption events to study impacts on
employment. Previous studies have measured these events by increases in automation
expenditures (J. E. Bessen et al. 2019), in the use of robots (Bonfiglioli et al. (2020); Humlum
(2019); Koch et al. (2019)), in the use of automated equipment (Acemoglu, Lelarge, and
4
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Restrepo (2020); Domini et al. (2019)) and in motive electric power (Aghion et al. 2020). The
challenge for this literature has been to control for unobserved factors correlated with
adoption that might contemporaneously affect employment. Several of the prior studies find
that firms that automate tend to have growing employment or revenues prior to the time of
adoption, suggesting that unobserved productivity or demand factors could be related to the
firm’s decision to adopt new technology. Koch et al. (2019) use propensity score matching to
control for unobserved trends; Aghion et al. (2020) use a Bartik-style instrumental variable
estimation under some assumptions about factor input rigidities. Our paper contributes to
this literature by using spikes in employment of software developers to measure large custom
software investment events, and proposing a novel methodology to purge the effects of
unobserved productivity and demand shocks by using control function estimates adapted
from the production function literature. Moreover, our paper contributes by providing a
picture of the differing impacts of IT spikes for firms with different characteristics.
Another contribution of our paper is that our labor demand equation separates the
effects of productivity, displacement, and markups on labor demand. A large literature has
looked at the productivity contribution of IT both at the aggregate level (see for example,
(Oliner and Sichel 2000; Jorgenson et al. 2005) and at the firm level (see for example,
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; 2003). However, these studies do not distinguish major custom
software from routine IT investments nor do they estimate labor demand impacts of IT. We
measure both IT spikes and also routine IT activity, measured as IT labor, following Tambe
and Hitt (2012).4 In addition, although we find that routine IT investment is correlated with

4

See also Bloom et al. (2012) and Harrigan et al. (2016).
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higher output, IT spikes are not correlated with greater productivity, suggesting that the
impact of major IT investments on employment does not occur through this channel.
Other researchers see new information technology implicit in labor’s declining share
of output (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014; D. Autor et al. 2020; Acemoglu and Restrepo
2018; Calligaris, Criscuolo, and Marcolin 2018). This could be because declining prices of IT
hardware cause firms to substitute capital for labor (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014) or
because automation transfers tasks from humans to machines (Acemoglu and Restrepo
2018) or because IT raises markups and margins (J. Bessen 2020b; Calligaris, Criscuolo, and
Marcolin 2018) or all of the above. Our analysis finds that IT spikes are not significantly
associated with rising capital-labor ratios, suggesting that their impact on labor’s share may
be from higher margins rather than from technological displacement or capital-labor
substitution.
We begin by motivating our use of discrete events to measure large custom software
investments and outlining our empirical approach. Then we describe our data, report our
results and conclude.

Information Technology Spikes
The nature of information technology (IT) has been changing. IT is now dominated
by firm-specific custom software rather than hardware or pre-packaged software. While
firm-specific software accounted for 33% of IT investment in 1985, it accounts for 55%
today.5 In 2016, the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that private investment in

This counts custom contracted and own-account (self-developed) software as a share of total gross
investment in software, computers, and peripherals. In addition, there has been a shift of hardware processing
to the cloud (Jin and McElheran 2017)
5
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proprietary software—both self-developed and custom contracted—was $250.4 billion,
almost as much as net capital investment. Not only is this investment large, it is also
qualitatively different from routine investments in IT inputs. For instance, routine word
processing software running on personal computers might well enhance productivity. But
when a firm builds a custom logistics system with proprietary features that rivals do not
have, that is different. Such systems may allow firms to earn quasi-rents, raising markups and
affecting labor demand.
Another difference is that large, custom IT projects tend to be risky and have
notoriously high rates of failure.6 The high uncertainty, combined with other characteristics
of software investment, tend to make much IT investment “lumpy,” that is, occurring in
discrete episodes of high investment. It is well-established that capital investment tends to be
lumpy (Haltiwanger, Cooper, and Power 1999; Doms and Dunne 1998; Nilsen and
Schiantarelli 2003). In theory, high uncertainty gives rise to lumpy behavior when the
investment is irreversible and when there are indivisibilities or nonconvex adjustment costs
(Pindyck 1991; Rothschild 1971). Investments in custom software are typically irreversible;
they cannot be resold because they are firm-specific. Moreover, large software systems have
large, indivisible fixed costs. In addition, associated organizational changes may have large
adjustment costs.
All of this suggests that much custom IT investment may occur in discrete episodes.
Below we define “IT spikes” and find that a large share of IT investment occurs in these

Michael Bloch, Sven Blumberg, and Jürgen Laartz, “Delivering large-scale IT projects on time, on budget, and
on value,” Digital McKinsey, October 2012, a study of 5,400 IT projects > $15 million found failures so bad in
17% of the projects that they threatened the existence of the company; on average costs run 45% higher and
56% less value than planned. Lars Mieritz, “Survey Shows Why Projects Fail,” Gartner, June 2012 in survey of
154 organizations, North America and Europe found failure rates of 28% for projects > $1 million; 20% for
projects smaller than $350k.
6
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episodes. Indeed, custom software development appears to be substantially lumpier than
capital expenditure. Using our definition, 47% of the total increase in the employment of
software developers occurred during IT spikes, yet these spikes accounted for only 12% of
firm-year observations in our data.

Empirical Model
Unobserved productivity and demand shocks
The standard staggered difference-in-differences equation for estimating the effect of
technology adoptions on employment is
(1)
𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

𝐷𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝟏(𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 & 𝑡 ≥ 𝜏𝑖 )

where 𝑙𝑖𝑡 is log employment for firm i at time t, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 are, respectively, firm and time
period fixed effects, 𝑇 represents the group of firms that adopt the technology, 𝜏𝑖 is the time
firm i adopted, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 represents unobserved productivity or demand shocks known to the firm
but unobservable to the econometrician, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents optimization errors, random
events such as weather, and other unforeseen errors. Under a parallel trends assumption, the
coefficient 𝛾 measures the average treatment effect of technology adoption.
A challenge to estimating this equation is that the unobserved shock might be
correlated with the likelihood of technology adoption, that is, corr[𝐷𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖𝑡 ] ≠ 0. For
example, a positive demand shock might make firms more likely to adopt and the demand
shock might increase employment independently of the adoption, biasing upwards the
estimate of 𝛾.
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This problem is very similar to the problem of simultaneity bias in production
function estimation discussed by Marschak and Andrews (1944) and the subject of a large
empirical literature. Using lowercase to designate logs, a Cobb-Douglas revenue production
function can be written
(2)
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
where y is revenue, l is labor, and k is capital. If the firm chooses labor with knowledge of
𝜔𝑖𝑡 , OLS estimates will be biased.
A major innovation of this paper is based on the recognition that a) there are wellestablished techniques in the production function literature for obtaining estimates of 𝜔𝑖𝑡 ,
and, b) under some simple assumptions, a labor demand function (and product demand
equation) similar to equation (1) can be derived from equation (2) incorporating these
estimates, 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 . Regressions on this labor demand equation should yield estimates of 𝛾 that
are consistent with respect to unobserved productivity and demand shocks.
Beginning with Olley and Pakes (1996), researchers have estimated unobserved 𝜔𝑖𝑡
using control functions. Under some assumptions, Olley and Pakes argue that unobserved
productivity can be captured as a nonparametric function of investment and capital,
permitting consistent estimates of 𝛽𝑙 . The intuition is that while capital is slow to adjust to a
productivity shock, investment adjusts immediately and increases with the magnitude of the
shock. With a further assumption that 𝜔𝑖𝑡 evolves as a Markov process, they are able to
estimate 𝛽𝑘 and back out estimates, 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 . Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose using
materials instead of investment as a proxy variable. Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)
allow for more general assumptions regarding the timing of employment in response to
shocks.
9
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Below, we use the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (ACF) setup using investment as the
proxy variable. We use ACF because it has more general assumptions about timing. We use
investment rather than materials as a proxy because in our data materials need to be
imputed, possibly introducing biases regarding IT (see below). We use revenue as our
outcome variable, assuming a fixed relationship between materials and output. However, we
find that our results are robust to alternative specifications.

Labor and product demand
Assuming a fixed product price elasticity of demand, we obtain a labor demand
equation from the first-order conditions implied by (2). The production function and price
equations are, suppressing firm and time subscripts,
(3)
𝑞 = ln 𝐴 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑙 + (1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝑘,

1

𝑝 = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 −𝜖

where q is log output, A is unobserved productivity and d is an unobserved demand
parameter. Defining
(4)
𝛽
1−𝛽
𝛽𝑙 ≡ , 𝛽𝑘 ≡
,
𝜇
𝜇

𝜔≡

ln 𝐴
+ ln 𝑑 ,
𝜇

𝜇≡

𝜖
𝜖−1

recovers equation (2). The associated first order profit maximizing conditions are
(5)
𝜕 𝑄 𝛽𝑄 𝑤𝜇
=
=
,
𝜕𝐿
𝐿
𝑝

𝜕 𝑄 (1 − 𝛽)𝑄 𝑟𝜇
=
=
𝜕𝐾
𝐾
𝑝

where w is the wage and r is the capital rental rate. From these we derive a labor demand
equation (see Appendix) where log labor is a function of three variables— 𝜔, 𝛽, and 𝜖—that
might be affected by firm technology choices:
10
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(6)
𝑤
𝑙 = 𝑓 1 (𝜖) + 𝜖 ∙ 𝜔 − (𝜖 − 1)𝑓 2 (𝛽) + ln 𝛽 − ln .
𝑟
where 𝑓 1 (𝜖) and 𝑓 2 (𝛽) are provided in the Appendix.
This equation captures three margins along which technology might affect labor
demand. First, by raising productivity, 𝜔, technology might increase product demand and
hence demand for labor. Second is 𝛽, which equals labor’s share of output.7 In Hicks (1963),
labor-saving technical change reduces 𝛽; in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), automation does
so as tasks are transferred from humans to machines. Third is 𝜖, which reflects firm market
power. If proprietary technology allows the firm to earn rents, then average markups, the
ratio of revenue to operating costs, should increase. It is straightforward to show (Appendix)
𝜖

that 𝜇 = 𝜖−1 equals the average markup. This means that technology rents would increase 𝜇
and decrease 𝜖. Below we explore how each of these margins is associated with IT spikes.
While (6) is a complicated expression, we develop an approximation that can be
estimated. To do this, we obtain estimates, 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 , from production function regressions. Also,
because the first order conditions imply
𝛽=

1
𝑟𝐾
1 + 𝑤𝐿

,

we use the log capital-labor ratio, 𝜅, to proxy for 𝛽. Finally, our measure of IT spikes, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 ,
captures changes in 𝜖 and any other impacts. Using Taylor series expansions, we obtain a
first-order approximation,

7

𝑤𝐿

By the first order condition for labor, 𝛽 = 𝑝𝑄 .
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(7a)
𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝜅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
and a second order approximation, including interaction terms,
(7b)
2
𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝜅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝜅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾6 𝜅𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.

These equations let us estimate the impact of IT spikes on labor demand, controlling for
unobserved productivity and demand shocks and also for changing labor share of output.
These equations also provide a framework for distinguishing the relative importance of the
three margins of impact for IT spikes. We develop similar equations for product demand
and estimate these as well.

Data
In this section, we describe our sample construction and define the main variables
for the empirical analysis.

Sample
Our main sources of data are Compustat and LinkedIn. We retrieve data on firm
characteristics such as revenues, capital, total employment, capital investment, industry codes
and country of incorporation from Compustat.

12
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We convert all variables defined in current dollars to 2009 dollars using deflators
from the BEA.8 We calculate capital as net property, plant and equipment. We define
operating margins as the operating income before depreciation and taxes divided by revenue.
Some production function estimation methods require measures of materials or
intermediates. Where data are available, we calculate materials as operating expenses minus
depreciation and staff expense (employee compensation). However, staff expense is only
reported for a fraction of Compustat firms, mostly in the financial sector. For the remainder
of firms, we impute the wage bill by multiplying the number of firm employees by the
industry employee compensation per employee. Unfortunately, this imputation is likely to be
problematic because wage levels are likely correlated with the IT share of the workforce,
making measurement error correlated with our variable of interest. For the same reason, our
production functions use revenue as the outcome variable rather than value added, which is
also likely to be mis-measured in a problematic way.
LinkedIn is our source of data on the composition of firms’ workforce. LinkedIn
allows users to post their profiles including resumes and they may choose to make their
profiles public. Our data were obtained for another project that used Google to search for
public profiles on LinkedIn from June to November of 2013 (Ge, Huang, and Png 2016).9
Each profile’s work experience section reports a series of jobs by date, job title, and
employer. For instance, one person might have been a “graphic design intern” at company X
from 1998 to 2002, and an “information architect” at company Y from 2002 to 2007.

We deflate revenues by the industry gross output deflator. We deflate capital and capital investment by the
investment deflator. We deflate wages and market value of equity using the deflator of the gross domestic
product.
8

9

We thank Ke-wei Huang for graciously sharing these data with us.
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We limit our sample period to years between 1990 and 2012. LinkedIn data may be
less reliable as we go further back in time, and 2012 is the last full year before these data
were collected.
We matched firms in Compustat and LinkedIn in a multistep process. First, we used
ticker symbols where these were available in the LinkedIn data. Next, for each firm name in
Compustat that we could not match at the previous step, we tried to identify all the possible
variations in the LinkedIn data, as LinkedIn users may list variations of a company name or
provide the name of a subsidiary as their employer. So we cleaned and standardized firm
names consistently in the two data sets and used a fuzzy matching algorithm on these names.
Then we manually reviewed the fuzzy matches to reduce false positives. This was a
burdensome task, so we focused our efforts on large companies, as it is more difficult to
retrieve additional information for a careful review on smaller organizations. Eventually, we
matched 4,262 firms active between 1990 and 2012.10
Our match coverage improves over time. The percentage of Compustat firms we can
match with LinkedIn firms increase from 25% in 1990 to 54% in 2012. Not surprisingly,
matched firms are substantially larger than unmatched firms in terms of revenue, employees
and capital and other variables related to firm size (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
Moreover, the coverage of LinkedIn improves over time, so we have more matches in recent
years. Because of the focus on large firms and the increase in coverage over time, the match
covers firms that account for 68% of the employees in Compustat in 1990, rising to over
90% of the employees in 2012. Finally, software engineers may be over-represented in
LinkedIn, so our matched firms are also more likely to be in IT-related industries. Note that

10

Details on the matching process are available upon request.
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both LinkedIn and Compustat are international, including non-US companies, but both sets
are dominated by US firms.
We use resume data from LinkedIn to define our key measure of IT spikes. This
measure is based on changes in the IT share of each firm’s workforce, that is, changes in the
ratio of software developers to total employees. We tally how many LinkedIn profiles report
working at a given firm in a given year and to calculate the share of these profiles that are in
software development jobs. To do this, we created a list of 1,791 job titles for software
development occupations. We included managers such as “information systems project
manager;” and we excluded job titles for tech support, maintenance, and basic operations.
Identifying software developers in this way, we tabulate the ratio of LinkedIn software
developers to LinkedIn total employees for each year for each firm from 1990 through 2012.
However, this ratio might not be representative of the total population of employees because
the relative usage of LinkedIn by software developers compared to non-IT employees might
have changed over time. To correct for changes in coverage, we calculated the total ratio of
software occupations to all workers in each year of the Current Population Survey. We use
this ratio to weight the firm-year observations so that they correspond to the ratio from the
Current Population Survey in aggregate.
We use also use the ratio of IT workers to total employees to calculate the number
of non-IT employees, multiplying the number of employees reported in Compustat by one
minus the IT share. Throughout the paper, when we refer to labor generally, we mean this
measure of non-IT labor. In addition, we use the LinkedIn data to flag companies that use
AI or Big Data by identifying a list of job titles associated with these technologies.11

These are “Hadoop” “big data” “quantitative analyst” “data scientist” “data science” “artificial intelligence”
“machine learning” “deep learning” “neural network” and “natural language processing.” We define a time11
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For each firm, we keep all the consecutive years with a positive IT share of
employees and those for which this is equal to zero but preceded by a year with a positive IT
share of employees, so we can compute growth rates. We discard firms for which we can
never define a growth rate in IT share of employees and firm-years without data in
Compustat, keep only the longest series of observations without gaps for each firm and, if
there are ties, we keep the most recent series because the quality of the LinkedIn improves
over time. Table A2 in the Appendix shows summary statistics for firm-years in our matched
sample. Table A3 shows the distribution by sector.12

Evidence on IT Spikes
Above we proposed that software investment tends to be “lumpy” because it is risky,
irreversible, and has large indivisibilities and/or non-convex adjustment costs. In this
section, we define a practical way of identifying these “spikes.” We can see evidence of the
lumpiness of the IT share growth in Figure 1. The solid line represents the distribution of
the year-over-year growth rate in firm IT shares. The dashed line represents a normal
distribution. Comparing the two distributions shows that the growth rates in the IT share
have a heavy upper tail—there are a disproportionate number of events where the growth
rate is 40% or above. Moreover, a very large proportion of the firm-years has a growth rate
close to zero.

invariant indicator equal to one for firms that employ at least one person listing these titles in their profile
during our sample period.
We also collected data from additional sources. These include mergers and acquisitions made by a company
from the SDC Platinum dataset, and the identity of CEOs from the ExecuComp database.
12
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We define a spike as a year when the percentage growth rate in the IT share exceeds
30 percent (for example, the IT share goes from 1.00 percent to 1.35 percent).13 A way to
gauge the lumpiness of IT hiring is to look at the share of hiring that occurs during spike
years. Although only 12 percent of the firm-year observations are spike years, these account
for 47 percent of the total increase in IT hiring in aggregate over the sample period.14
To gain a sense of spikes and their proprietary nature, consider three examples from
2007. After a decade of rapid growth, eBay invested $89 million in software development
staff and consultants to enhance user experience and add new products. That year Danske
Bank, Denmark’s largest retail bank, also hired a large number of software developers.
Danske Bank had developed an effective IT banking platform, but on acquiring a group of
banks in Baltic countries, they needed to adapt their platform and integrate existing systems
from this group. In 2007 also, the aerospace division of Crane Company identified a market
opportunity to sell rugged mobile computers to military suppliers. They hired software
developers and acquired a business unit of an embedded computer firm in order to rapidly
put together a product and bring it to market. In each case, the firm responded to an
idiosyncratic opportunity, aiming to gain a competitive advantage that might earn rents.
Characteristics of these spikes are explored further in the Appendix. Among the
findings: 1) the frequency of spikes grew during the 1990s, but does not exhibit a strong
trend since then; nor does the frequency seem to respond consistently to changes in the
business cycle (figure A2); 2) Table A4 shows the frequency of spikes in the sample of
matched firms. About one third of the firms do not spike during the sample period. Of

13

We report results based on alternative definitions of IT spike in the Appendix.

Figure A1 shows also shows evidence that the growth in IT share of employees tends to be lumpy: within
firm, few years are characterized by very large growth.
14
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those that do spike, about 40 percent spike only once, the remainder spiking more often, up
to 7 times. For firms that spike multiple times, our analysis focuses on the spike with the
largest growth.15
Figure 2 provides further evidence on the lumpiness of spikes. The chart shows the
mean and median growth rate of the IT share around the year of the largest spike. On
average, there is little growth prior to the spike, a sharp and discrete increase with the spike,
and little growth afterwards. The spike typically represents a permanent increase in the firm’s
IT share of the workforce.
Firms that spike tend to be smaller than firms that do not spike, both before and
after the largest spike (see Table A5). Unreported analysis confirms this using only data for
the first year in our sample for each firm. This is related to the definition of spike that we
use. Large firms, which aggregate multiple business divisions, are less likely to see a 30
percent growth in IT share for the entire company even if individual business units spike.
The difference in size may also be related to differences in the distributions of spikers and
non-spikers by industry.
We also analyze the relationship between firm size and the occurrence of spikes in a
regression framework. We estimate a set of linear probability models in which we regress an
indicator equal to one in the year of a spike (multiplied by 100 to facilitate the interpretation
of the coefficients as percentage-point changes) against measures of firm size in the previous
year and calendar year effects. For these estimates we use all the spikes, allowing firms to
have more than one spell. Spells start either in a firm’s second year in the sample (because of

The largest spikes account for 25 percent of the total increase in IT hiring in aggregate over the sample
period, although they are only 5 percent of the firm-year observations. Our econometric analysis below is
robust to excluding firms with multiple spikes.
15
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our definition of spike and because we use lags of the predictors) or in the year after a spike,
and end either in a spike year or at the end of the sample period. We model the baseline
hazard of a spike with a set of “age” dummies, where age is defined as the number of years
since the start of the spell. We use three measures of firm size (all in logs): revenues, non-IT
employees and market capitalization. The first three columns of table A6 show that they are
all negatively correlated with spikes. However, in the last three columns of that table we also
show that the growth of revenue, non-IT employees and market capitalization is not
significantly correlated with spikes. These results suggest that while smaller firms are more
likely to experience IT spikes, they are not growing more than other firms before the spikes,
a result that we will confirm below with other methods.
Finally, Figure 3 shows general trends of revenue and employment around the year
of the largest spike. The chart shows medians of these variables across all firms that spike,
without any controls. Both quantities exhibit secular trends both before and after the spike,
with revenue tending to grow faster. A slight pickup, especially in revenue, occurs
immediately after the spike. In the analysis below we will look at these trends, but also
control for a variety of considerations.

Results
Production functions
Table 1 shows a range of alternative production function estimates, including our
preferred specification in column 4. In all regressions, the outcome variable is the log of
revenue, and we cluster the standard errors by firm. For reference, the first two columns
show a simple OLS regression and an OLS regression with firm and year fixed effects. The
next four columns show regressions using various control function methods. These
19
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regressions all include adjustments for firm exit. Columns 3 and 4 use the log of investment
as the proxy variable. Column 3 uses the Olley-Pakes (1996) method while column 4 uses
Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015). We prefer the ACF method because it is more general
and because it allows more consistent assumption about the timing of production decisions.
Columns 5 and 6 use the log of materials as a proxy variable, column 5 showing the
Levinsohn-Petrin method and column 6 the ACF method. As noted above, we impute
materials for most observations and this imputation may be correlated with firm IT use,
introducing possible biases.16
In the following difference-in-differences models, we will use the 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 estimated by
the model in column (4) to control for productivity and demand shocks.

Employment and revenue estimates
The top panel of Table 2 reports difference-in-differences estimates of the labor
demand equations, while the bottom panel reports findings for the comparable revenue
equations. Instead of firm fixed effects, the specification in column 1 includes a single
dummy variable for whether the firm is a spiker or not, which captures the “selection effect”
into the IT spikes. This specification show a very large increase in employment and revenues
after the IT spike, and the coefficients of the “selection” indicators confirm that firms that
experience the IT spikes are smaller than the other firms in our sample.
Column 2 drops the spiker dummy and adds firm fixed effects to the regression
model. The IT spikes are associated with an increase in employment by 7.0%, and an
increase in revenue by 10.9%.

Throughout the paper, we estimate all models with firm fixed effects using the Stata package “reghdfe”
developed by Correia (2018) and all models with a control function using the Stata package “prodest”(Rovigatti
and Mollisi 2018).
16
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The previous regressions do not control for unobserved productivity and demand
shocks. Columns 3 and 4 introduce controls as specified in equations (7a) and (7b)
respectively. We obtain estimates of 𝜔
̂ in a first stage regression, using the ACF method with
investment as the proxy variable, and use these estimates as additional control variable in our
difference-in-differences models. To obtain the standard errors for these regressions, we
bootstrap (50 repetitions) the two-stage procedure, clustering by firm. Column 4 reports the
marginal effects of the interaction equation. We report the corresponding regression
coefficients in Table A8. The inclusion of the additional controls has little influence on
coefficients of the IT spikes, which are almost unchanged. This implies that these controls
are not strongly correlated with the occurrence of spikes.17 Our interpretation is that the
estimates in column 2 are not substantially biased by unobserved productivity and demand
shocks.
While we saw in Table 1 that there are differences between the estimates of the
production function obtained with various methods, these differences create only modest
variation in our estimates of the effects of IT spikes. Table A7 in the Appendix shows
estimates for the difference-in-differences models of employment and revenue in column (3)
of Table 2 using the 𝜔
̂ estimated with all the control function methods in Table 1. The
estimates that use the Olley-Pakes method, the Levinsohn-Petrin method, and the ACF
method with materials as proxy variable to produce 𝜔
̂ are somewhat lower, but the
coefficient of the IT spike dummy is positive and statistically significant at conventional
levels in all models.

17

Calculating simple correlation coefficients, 𝜔
̂ has a small, but statistically significant negative correlation (.03) with D, and 𝜅 has a small (.03) and statistically insignificant correlation; adding firm and year fixed effects,
neither relationship is significant, economically or statistically. For 𝜔
̂, the coefficient is -.002 (.004); for 𝜅, it is
.007 (.013).
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Under a parallel trends assumption, the coefficient of the post IT spike dummy
estimates the impact of IT spikes on employment and revenue. This assumption is more
plausible if firms that experience an IT spike and those that do not are on similar trends in
employment and revenue before the IT spike. In order to examine the pre-spike trends and
the dynamic effects of the IT spikes, we estimate two event-study models, and plot the
coefficients for an eleven-year window around the IT spikes in Figures 4 and 5.18 Both
graphs show that the pre-IT-spike trends in employment and revenue are very similar, and
there is significant rise in employment and revenue of the spikers after the event.19
Revenues appear to grow significantly faster than labor after the spikes, suggesting
that labor’s share of revenue declines. This will be true as long as wages do not substantially
increase. For that portion of the sample reporting staff expense, we found no evidence of
rising average pay, implying that labor share of revenue did indeed decline.20
Labor’s share of revenue can decline for two reasons: labor’s share of output (𝛽)
declines or the ratio of cost to revenue declines, that is, average markups, (𝜇), increase. The
first changes the composition of costs away from labor, the second changes the wedge

18To

produce the event study graphs, we estimate two regressions based on the equation
ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + ∑𝑘≠−1 𝛾𝑘 ∙ 𝟏(𝑘 = 𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖 ) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the log of labor or revenue, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑡 are firm
and year fixed effects, and 𝛾𝑘 ∙ 𝟏(𝑘 = 𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖 ) is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that have an IT
spike 𝑘 years before/after the spike (the omitted category is the year before the spike). The coefficients 𝛾𝑘
measure the difference in the trend of employment or revenue before (𝑘<0) and after (𝑘 ≥ 0) the IT spike,
ceteris paribus. Although our regressions include the year-relative-to-spike dummies for all the pre- and postspike time periods (from year -22 to 21), few observations are available far from the spike time, leading to large
standard errors. So we report only the most central coefficients.
We test the equality of the pre-spike trends with an F-test of the null hypothesis that the pre-spike
coefficients (including those not shown in the figures) are jointly zero. The test for the trend in revenues
cannot reject the null hypothesis at conventional levels. The test for the trend in non-IT labor rejects the null
hypothesis at 5%. However, this rejection is essentially driven by few coefficients for time periods more than
10 years before the spike, where we have relatively few observations and the results may be driven by outliers.
19

Using a simple difference-in-differences specification similar to the one in column (2) of table 2 with log
mean wage as the outcome variable, the treatment coefficient is .003 (.020) in our sub-sample of 3,502
observations.
20
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between costs and revenue. Our estimates suggest that the main impact of IT spikes is to
increase markups—a decrease in 𝛽 would reduce firm employment and increase the capital
labor ratio, all else equal. Instead, we find that employment increases and the capital labor
ratio does not change following IT spikes.21 Moreover, although it is a noisy measure, the
operating margin is positively correlated with IT spikes.22 Thus, it appears that the main
impact of major proprietary IT investments is to increase firm market power rather than to
displace labor.
In Table A9 in the Appendix, we report on a number of robustness checks,
estimating variations of the model in column (2) of Table 2. First, we estimate a model that
substitutes the year effects with year-by-4-digit-SIC-code. These effects should capture all
the time-varying shocks that are common to firms in an industry. Second, we estimate a
model discarding the control group and exploiting only the timing of the IT spikes for the
subsample of spikers for identification. Third, we re-define the spikes using a higher
threshold in the growth of the IT share of employment (50% instead of 30%). Fourth, we
re-define the IT spikes requiring that an IT spike is not only the largest in relative terms for a
firm, but it also represents an increase in the number of software developers by at least 10
employees (column (4)). Fifth, we drop all firms that spike more than once during the
sample period. Sixth, we drop firm-years characterized by very high or low employment or
revenue growth (those in the top and bottom 1% of the distributions of employment or
revenue growth). Finally, one may be concerned that the IT spikes might occur around

Estimating a model similar to the model in column (2) of table 2 with the log of the capital labor ratio as
outcome, we obtain a coefficient of the IT spike equal to .007, with a standard error of .0132 (p-value= 0.592).
21

22

In an unreported model, we regress the operating margin (trimmed of the 1% tails) against the post-IT-spike
dummy, controlling for firm and year fixed effects. This regression shows that the IT spike is associated with a
statistically significant increase of .016 (standard error .005) in operating margin. This regression is sensitive to
extreme values and the extent of winsorizing.
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mergers and acquisitions or changes in other company characteristics. So we control for the
number of M&A events that involved the focal firm in each year and for two time-varying
company characteristics such as adverting and research and development expenses.23
Although the magnitude of the coefficient of the IT spike changes, the coefficient of the IT
spike is positive and statistically significant at 1% in all these additional models for non-IT
labor, and in all but one of the models for revenue, where the it is statistically significant at
10%.24

Heterogeneity of effects
Table 3 and Table 4 explore the heterogeneity of the response of employment and
revenue to the IT spikes. To explore heterogeneous responses to different values of
categorical variable z, we estimate specifications based on
(8)
ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑧 ∙ 𝟏(𝑡 ≥ 𝜏𝑖 & 𝑧 = 𝑗) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ,
𝑗

where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is either employment or revenue.
Some people argue that artificial intelligence technologies will have a different effect
on employment because these technologies are more about replacing human tasks (Ford
2015). Panel A measures the impacts by whether the firm employs AI or Big Data software

We take the logs of one plus advertising expenses and research and development expenses to use firm-year
observations that contain zeros for these variables.
23

Another concern is that IT spikes might happen when there is change in the top management of the
company, and our regressions are picking up the effect of these changes. However, CEO changes are not
correlated with the IT spikes in the subsample of firms for which we have information on the identity of
CEOs. Specifically, the correlation between IT spikes and a CEO change in the same year or in one of the
previous four years is between -0.0221 and 0.0087 (-0.0149 and 0.0026 for the largest spike, i.e. the one we use
in our regressions).
24
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developers at any point in time in our sample period. We find that the AI-users exhibit much
stronger revenue and employment growth.25 This does not necessarily mean that AI/Big
Data causes more rapid growth; it could simply be that more rapidly growing companies are
more likely to employ AI. However, these estimates are hard to reconcile with the idea that
AI is particularly job-destroying in the firms using it.
Panel B looks at differences between industries that use software as part of their
products and those that do not.26 Those that use software as part of their products exhibit
higher growth in both employment and revenue, on average. Nevertheless, those that
develop software only for internal use show strong growth.27
Panel C looks at changes in response over time. This is important because aggregate
productivity grows when firms increase their productivity and when firms that are more
productive grow faster. Decker et al. (2018) argue that the pace of job reallocation has
declined since 2000, contributing to slowing aggregate productivity growth. They find
slowing job reallocation is driven by declining firm responsiveness to productivity shocks.
Consistent with this idea, our analysis shows that the response of employment and revenue
to the IT spikes declined sharply.28

A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients for AI-users and for other firms at 1%
level in both columns.
25

The former include NAICS 5112, software publishers, 5181, Internet service providers and web search
portals, 5182, Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services, 5191 Other information services, 5415
Computer Systems Design and Related Services, 3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing,
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing, 3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component
Manufacturing, and 3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments manufacturing.
26

A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients for IT-producers and for other firms at
1% and 10%, respectively, for the labor and revenue models.
27

Wald tests of the equality of these coefficients reject the null hypothesis at 1% and 5% respectively for the
labor and revenue models.
28

25
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3371016

Panel D explores whether “US does IT better,” as proposed by Bloom et al. (2012),
who argue that better managerial practices at US-based firms generate greater returns to IT
investments. While we cannot interpret differences between US and non-US firms in our
data as entirely driven by managerial practices, we find that US firms grow more both in
terms of employment and revenue after the IT spikes, although we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients for US and non-US firms at conventional levels
of statistical significance.
Finally, Panel E explores the differential effect of IT for new firms (those publicly
listed for 5 years or fewer). Consistent with the view that startups are better able to utilize
new technology, we find much larger gains in employment and revenue after the IT spikes
for new firms.
Table 4 compares several industry sectors. There is significant heterogeneity. In
particular, manufacturing industries exhibit much smaller or even negative labor and revenue
growth than do tertiary sector industries such as trade, FIRE (Finance, Insurance and Real
Estate), and services. A possible explanation is that firms in manufacturing industries may
have lower price elasticities of demand. Bessen (2020a) suggests that demand elasticity in
manufacturing industries was initially high but declined as these industries were progressively
automated; tertiary sector industries may have higher demand elasticity in part because they
have experienced far less productivity-improving technical change.

Conclusion
In recent decades, firms have sharply increased their investments in intangibles in
general and in proprietary information technology in particular, including investments in

26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3371016

artificial intelligence and big data. Furthermore, these new technologies have dramatic new
capabilities, raising fears that they may lead to large scale displacement of workers.
We have developed a novel way to measure the adoption of major proprietary IT. In
contrast to routine investments, major new information technology tends to occur in
discrete episodes marked by substantial hiring of software developers. We use these events
to measure the effects of adopting this technology, controlling for time-invariant firm
characteristics as well as unobserved productivity and demand shocks. Contrary to common
fears about machines replacing humans, we find that major firm investments in custom
information technology tend to increase firm employment and revenues. Moreover, this
effect is substantially stronger for firms using AI. The evidence shown here does not support
the view that these technologies are mainly about taking over tasks performed by humans.
However, IT spikes do seem to decrease labor’s share of output. Revenue increases
faster than labor, suggesting that firm markups increase. This is a natural result because
proprietary IT presumably earns quasi-rents and it is consistent with evidence that IT is
related to higher markups and greater industry concentration (Calligaris, Criscuolo, and
Marcolin 2018; J. Bessen 2020b). On the other hand, the capital-labor ratio does not rise,
implying that this is not biased technical change as in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018).
Different types of firms respond very differently following IT spikes. Employment
grows faster following a spike in firms that use AI, in new firms, and in US-based firms,
perhaps because of differences in management quality (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen
2012). Mature industries such as non-durable manufacturing experience employment
declines while the trade, services, and financial sectors see strong growth, perhaps evidence
of differences in demand elasticity (J. Bessen 2020a). Also, employment growth following
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spikes seems to have slowed after the midpoint of our sample in 2002, consistent with other
evidence on firm growth dynamics (Decker et al. 2018).
Even though IT spikes appear to increase employment, other automation
technologies might well reduce employment at the firm level.29 And even though IT spikes
increase firm employment, they might reduce employment in the aggregate economy. These
investments surely affect rival firms, firms in downstream and upstream industries, and
consumers. Also, our research design does not necessarily capture the effects of proprietary
investment at the largest multi-division firms because spikes at individual business units may
be obscured in aggregate numbers. Despite the limitations of this study, large custom
investments in firm-specific IT appear to be an important aspect of the role of technology in
the economy.

Bessen et al. (2019) find that automation expenditures have a different effect on worker separations than
computer investments.
29
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Production function estimates
Outcome
Model

Log IT labor
Log non-IT labor
Log capital
Log materials

OLS
(1)

OLS FE
(2)

0.080**
(0.011)
0.579**
(0.017)
0.302**
(0.009)

-0.005
(0.010)
0.653**
(0.029)
0.206**
(0.018)

Log revenue
ACF
OP
investment
(3)
(4)
0.056**
(0.011)
0.575**
(0.018)
0.135**
(0.047)

0.083**
(0.000)
0.569**
(0.000)
0.309**
(0.000)

LP
(5)

ACF
materials
(6)

0.059**
(0.005)
0.324**
(0.009)
0.195**
(0.020)
0.340**
(0.014)

0.064**
(0.000)
0.331**
(0.001)
0.165**
(0.013)
0.522**
(0.006)

Observations
47,086
47,003
43,897
43,897
44,143
44,143
Firms
4,083
4,000
3,830
3,830
3,955
3,955
The unit of observation is firm-year. Model (2) has firm and year fixed effects. Model (3) uses the Olley and
Pakes (1996) model; Model (4), our preferred specification, uses the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer method
(2015) with investment as the proxy variable. Models (5) and (6) use imputed log materials as the proxy
variable, model (5) with the Levinsohn-Petrin method and model (6) with the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer
method. Estimates in (3)-(6) include adjustments for firm exit. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in
parentheses (for models (3)-(6), based on 50 bootstrap replications). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2: Employment and Revenue Equation Estimates
(1)
No firm FE

Model

(2)
FE

(3)
Omega and K/L

(4)
Interactions
(marginal effects)

0.070**
(0.017)

0.071**
(0.018)
-0.211
(0.301)
-0.091**
(0.033)

0.077**
(0.019)
0.504
(0.310)
-0.068*
(0.033)

49,991
0.049
4,242

49,967
0.942
4,218

43,823
0.943
3,756

43,823
0.944
3,756

0.628**
(0.056)

0.109**
(0.018)

0.107**
(0.019)
0.613*
(0.258)
0.172**
(0.025)

0.109**
(0.019)
0.818**
(0.262)
0.169**
(0.025)

Panel A. Outcome: Log non-IT employees
Post spike

0.596**
(0.053)

Productivity/demand shock (𝜔
̂)
Log capital / non-IT labor (𝜅)
Spiker

-1.125**
(0.082)

Observations
R-squared
Firms
Panel B. Outcome: Log revenue
Post spike
Productivity/demand shock (𝜔
̂)
Log capital / non-IT labor (𝜅)
Spiker

-1.239**
(0.088)

Observations
50,205
50,202
43,823
43,823
R-squared
0.051
0.939
0.940
0.941
Firms
4,203
4,200
3,756
3,756
The unit of observation is firm-year. All models are estimated with OLS and include year effects. Columns
2-4 also include firm fixed effects. First stage estimation of 𝜔
̂ uses the ACF method with investment as the
proxy variable. Column 3 reports the coefficient estimates from equation (7a). Column 4 shows the marginal
effects from the specification in equation (7b) (coefficients in Appendix Table A8). Robust standard errors
clustered by firm in parentheses (for models (3)-(4), based on 50 bootstrap replications). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 3: Heterogeneous effects of IT spikes
(1)
Log non-IT employees

(2)
Log revenue

Post spike not AI

0.052**
(0.018)

0.095**
(0.018)

Post spike AI

0.268**
(0.064)

0.271**
(0.065)

Post spike not IT

0.042*
(0.020)

0.089**
(0.020)

Post spike IT

0.170**
(0.040)

0.179**
(0.042)

Post spike pre-2002

0.128**
(0.027)

0.154**
(0.027)

Post spike post-2002

0.005
(0.025)

0.060*
(0.027)

Post spike not US

0.055
(0.043)

0.055
(0.041)

Post spike US

0.072**
(0.019)

0.117**
(0.019)

-0.016
(0.022)

0.007
(0.021)

Outcome
Panel A: AI/Big Data

Panel B: IT producing

Panel C: Time period

Panel D: US based

Panel E: New firms
Post spike old firm

Post spike new firm

0.291**
0.366**
(0.027)
(0.032)
The unit of observation is firm-year. All models are estimated with OLS, and include year and firm fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 4: Heterogeneity by industry
(1)
Log non-IT employees

(2)
Log revenue

Post spike nondurable manufacturing

-0.090*
(0.044)

-0.019
(0.048)

Post spike durable manufacturing

0.024
(0.032)

0.060
(0.033)

Post spike transport and utilities

-0.028
(0.059)

0.142*
(0.056)

Post spike trade

0.209**
(0.053)

0.175**
(0.068)

Post spike finance

0.146**
(0.051)

0.229**
(0.040)

Post spike service

0.172**
(0.043)

0.141**
(0.046)

Outcome

Post spike others

0.129
0.099
(0.075)
(0.074)
The unit of observation is firm-year. All models are estimated with OLS, and include year and firm fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Figure 1: Distribution of growth in IT share of employment

Notes. The figure plots the kernel density estimate of growth in IT share of employees (solid line) and
compares it with a normal distribution (dashed line).
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Figure 2: Growth in IT share of employees around highest spikes

Notes. The figure plots the mean and the median of the growth in IT share of employees in an 11-year
window around the year of the highest spike for firms that spikes at least once.
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Figure 3: Growth in revenue and non-IT employees around highest spikes

Notes. The figure plots the medians of revenue and non-IT employees in an 11-year window around the
year of the highest spike for firms that spikes at least once. Revenues and non-IT employees in each year
are normalized dividing their value in the current year by the value in the year before highest spike.
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Figure 4: trend in non-IT employees around spike, difference-in-differences

Notes. This figure plots the coefficients (solid line) and the 95% confidence intervals (shaded area) of a set
of year-relative-to-spike indicators from an OLS regressions similar to model (2) in table 2. The omitted
category is the year before the spike. While the regression includes the full sets of coefficients, we report
here only those in an 11-year window around the year of the spike. The unit of observation is a firm-year.
The outcome variable is the log of non-IT employees. The model includes year and firm fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm.
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Figure 4: trend in revenues around spike, difference-in-differences estimates

Notes. This figure plots the coefficients (solid line) and the 95% confidence intervals (shaded area) of a set
of year-relative-to-spike indicators from an OLS regressions similar to model (2) in table 2. The omitted
category is the year before the spike. While the regression includes the full sets of coefficients, we report
here only those in an 11-year window around the year of the spike. The unit of observation is a firm-year.
The outcome variable is the log of revenues. The model includes year and firm fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered by firm.
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Appendix
Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Distribution of growth in IT share of employees by rank within firm

Notes. The figure plots the mean and the median of the growth in IT share of employees by rank within
firm.
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Figure A2: Frequency of spikes by year

Notes. This figure plots the number of spikes occurring in each sample year and the number of spikes
limited to the largest spike per firm.
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Table A1: Comparison of means for matched and unmatched firms
Variable

Unmatched
Matched
T-statistic
Norm. Diff.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Revenue (mill $2009)
642.64
4,626.56
72.27
0.34
Employees (total, 1000s)
2.50
15.11
70.55
0.34
Capital (mill $2009)
312.31
1,888.88
58.38
0.27
Wages (mill $2009)
68.82
74.16
17.07
0.09
IT producing industry
0.16
0.21
26.06
0.13
US firms
0.91
0.88
19.98
-0.10
Capital investment (mill $2009)
52.64
339.75
50.76
0.25
Market value of equity (mill $2009)
742.29
5,944.15
72.30
0.33
First year in Compustat
1,989.60
1,986.15
50.73
-0.25
Year
1,999.69
2,002.34
85.28
0.43
Observations
97,563
64,086
Notes. Unit of observation is firm-year. Unmatched are firm-years in Compustat we cannot match to firmyears in LinkedIn. Matched are those we can match. Columns (1) and (2) report means by group. Column
(3) reports the t-statistics from a test of the difference between the means in the first two columns. Column
(4) reports the normalized difference in average covariates between groups.

Table A2: descriptive statistics
Variable
N
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Post spike
51,382
0.4
0.5
0.0
1.0
Spiker
51,382
0.7
0.4
0.0
1.0
Growth in IT share of employees
47,120
0.1
0.3
-1.0
4.7
Revenue
50,205
5,423.7
17,541.3
0.0
440,944.5
Non-IT employees
50,108
17.2
53.9
0.0
2,182.0
IT employees
50,108
0.3
1.1
0.0
32.7
Capital
50,134
2,161.0
8,328.5
0.0
247,286.0
Capital/Non-IT employees
48,809
206.4
1947.7
0.0
229,661.4
Wages
49,655
74.7
74.4
0.0
13,773.5
Capital investment
48,012
386.2
1,663.4
-401.6
49,105.4
Materials
48,599
2,939.7
12,291.3
0.0
389,757.0
Market value of equity
51,290
6,974.4
23,668.1
0.0
744,989.4
AI/Big Data
51,382
0.1
0.3
0.0
1.0
It producing
51,382
0.2
0.4
0.00
1.0
US firm
51,382
0.9
0.3
0.0
1.0
M&As
51,382
0.8
1.8
0.0
60.0
Advertising expenses
51,382
57.3
329.5
0.0
9,016.1
R&D Expenses
51,382
123.0
631.4
0.0
14,046.2
First year in Compustat
51,382
1,985.4
16.3
1,950.0
2,011.0
Year
51,382
2,002.9
6.0
1,990.0
2,012.0
Labor share of revenue*
49,100
0.3
0.3
0.0
2.7
Operating margin*
49,200
0.1
0.3
-3.6
0.6
CEO change
22,477
0.1
0.3
0.0
1.0
Notes. Unit of observation is firm-year. All the dollar amounts are in millions of 2009 dollars. Employment
data in thousands of employees. *Trimmed of 1% top and bottom tails.
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Table A3: sample by industry
Industry
N
Durable manufacturing
14,518
Service
9,847
Finance
7,629
Nondurable manufacturing
7,088
Transport and utilities
5,245
Trade
4,417
Other
2,638
Total
51,382
Notes. Unit of observation is firm-year.

%
28.30%
19.20%
14.80%
13.80%
10.20%
8.60%
5.10%
100.00%

Table A4: Frequency of spikes per firm
Number of spikes per firm Number of firms
0
1,468
1
1,107
2
768
3
513
4
271
5
93
6
34
7
8
Total
4,262
Notes. Unit of observation is a firm.

Percent of firms
34.44
25.97
18.02
12.04
6.36
2.18
0.80
0.19
100.00

Table A5 comparison of firm-years pre- and post-spike
Pre spike
Post spike
T-stat
Norm. Diff.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Revenue
6,460.05
4,140.15
14.76
-0.13
Non-IT employees
19.72
14.19
11.45
-0.10
Capital
2,404.33
1,858.98
7.29
-0.07
Capital/Non-IT employees
193.65
222.02
1.60
0.01
Wages
74.04
75.48
2.14
0.02
AI/Big Data
0.18
0.09
29.25
-0.26
IT producing
0.26
0.22
9.30
-0.08
Labor share of revenue*
0.32
0.31
1.62
-0.01
Operating margin*
0.11
0.11
2.37
0.02
Observations
28,536
22,846
Notes. Unit of observation is firm-year. Pre-spike observations include firm-years for firms that do not
spike and those before the year of the highest spike for the spikers. Columns (1) and (2) report means by
group. Column (3) reports the t-statistics from a test of the difference between the means in the first two
columns. Column (4) reports the normalized difference in average covariates between groups. *Trimmed of
1% top and bottom tails.
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Table A6: Predictors of spikes
Outcome
Specification
Revenue
(1)
Lagged
revenue

Non-IT
labor
(2)

1[spike] X 100
OLS
Market cap Change in Changed in nonrevenue
IT labor
(3)
(4)
(5)

Change in
market cap
(6)

-1.11**
(0.08)

Lagged nonIT employees

-1.07**
(0.08)

Lagged
market cap

-1.04**
(0.07)

Lagged
change in
revenue

0.14

(0.54)
Lagged
changed in
non-IT
employees

-0.25

(0.60)
Lagged
change in
market cap

0.40

(0.29)
Observations
46,002
45,838
47,058
41,802
41,401
42,780
R-squared
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
Mean outcome 12.72
12.63
12.71
12.23
12.11
12.21
Firms
4200
4231
4260
3973
3984
4033
Notes. Unit of observation is firm-year. The outcome is an indicator variable equal to one in the year of a
spike, multiplied by 100. Firms at risk of a spike from their first year in the sample, or the first year after a
spike (i.e. firms may have multiple spells). All models include year effects and year-since-spell-start
dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by firm. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table A7: Sensitivity to alternative production function estimates

Model

(1)
OP

(2)
ACF/invest

(3)
LP

(4)
ACF/materials

0.045**
(0.012)
3.020**
(0.432)
-0.503**
(0.083)

0.071**
(0.018)
0.262
(0.301)
-0.065*
(0.033)

0.046*
(0.018)
1.191
(0.645)
-0.013
(0.044)

0.059**
(0.019)
-0.124
(0.295)
-0.048
(0.029)

43,823
0.975
3,756

43,823
0.943
3,756

44,021
0.953
3,833

44,021
0.947
3,833

0.085**
(0.014)
2.745**
(0.353)
-0.248**
(0.076)

0.107**
(0.019)
0.613*
(0.258)
0.172**
(0.025)

0.076**
(0.018)
2.073**
(0.576)
0.185**
(0.025)

0.096**
(0.020)
0.175
(0.297)
0.150**
(0.026)

Panel A. Outcome: Log non-IT employees
Post spike
Productivity/demand shock (𝜔
̂)
Log capital / non-IT labor (𝜅)

Observations
R-squared
Firms
Panel B. Outcome: Log revenue
Post spike
Productivity/demand shock (𝜔
̂)
Log capital / non-IT labor (𝜅)

Observations
43,823
43,823
44,021
44,021
R-squared
0.962
0.940
0.957
0.943
Firms
3,756
3,756
3,833
3,833
Notes. The unit of observation is firm-year. Showing second stage estimates where first stage uses the
indicated method to estimate production function. All models contain firm and year fixed effects. All models
estimated with the Stata package developed by Mollisis and Rovignati (2016) in the first stage and OLS in
the second. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

46
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3371016

Table A8: Interaction Regressions
Outcome
Post spike
Productivity/demand shock (𝜔
̂)
Post spike x shock (𝐷 ∙ 𝜔
̂)
Log capital / non-IT labor (𝜅)
Post spike x capital/labor (𝐷 ∙ 𝜅)
Capital/labor squared (𝜅 2 )

(1)
Log non-IT employees

(2)
Log revenue

-1.325*
(0.543)
0.195
(0.333)
0.298**
(0.107)
0.248
(0.128)
-0.006
(0.016)
-0.041**
(0.015)

-0.819
(0.606)
0.582
(0.302)
0.202
(0.121)
0.448**
(0.091)
-0.010
(0.016)
-0.036**
(0.011)

Observations
43,823
43,823
R-squared
0.944
0.941
Firms
3,756
3,756
Notes. The unit of observation is firm-year. Models estimated with ACF in the first stage and OLS in the
second and include firm and year fixed effects. First stage estimation of 𝜔
̂ uses the ACF method with
investment as the proxy variable. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (50
repetitions). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table A9: Employment and Revenue Equation Estimates, robustness checks

Model

(1)
Industryby-year

(2)
Spikers

(3)
Higher
spikes

(4)
At least
10 more
IT
employees

(5)
No multispikers

(6)
No
growth
tails

(7)
Timevarying
controls

Panel A. Outcome: Log non-IT employees
Post spike

0.065**
(0.018)

0.068**
(0.016)

0.060**
(0.021)

0.069**
(0.025)

0.106**
(0.028)

0.074**
(0.017)

0.074**
(0.016)

Observations
R-squared
Firms

48,160
0.955
4,146

36,599
0.930
2,775

49,967
0.942
4,218

49,967
0.942
4,218

24,993
0.956
2,539

49,041
0.946
4,198

49,967
0.949
4,218

0.170**
(0.030)

0.110**
(0.017)

0.113**
(0.016)

Panel B. Outcome: Log revenue
Post spike

0.098**
(0.019)

0.118**
(0.017)

0.088**
(0.021)

0.042
(0.025)

Observations 48,447
36,859
50,202
50,202
25,045
49,238
50,202
R-squared
0.953
0.924
0.939
0.938
0.953
0.943
0.945
Firms
4,129
2,757
4,200
4,200
2,533
4,158
4,200
Notes. The unit of observation is firm-year. All models are estimated with OLS, and include firm fixed
effects. Sample for column (2) contains only firms with an IT spike. Sample for column (5) excludes firms
with more than one IT spike. Sample for column (6) excludes firms with at least one year in the top 1% or
bottom 1% of the distribution of non-IT employment (panel A) or revenue (panel B) in the sample. In column
(3) the post-spike indicator is computed using a 50% threshold. In column (4) the post-spike indicator is
computed using a 30% threshold and an increase in the number of IT employees by at least 10 employees.
Models in column (1) includes industry-by-year effects (SIC 4-digit). Models (2)-(7) include year effects.
Model (7) includes also the annual count of M&As, and the logs of one plus advertising expense and one
plus research and development expenses. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05
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Labor demand equation
From the first order condition for labor and the price elasticity of demand,
(A1)
𝐿=

𝛽𝑌 𝛽𝑝1−𝜖 𝑑𝜖
=
.
𝑤𝜇
𝑤𝜇

We can obtain an expression for p using Euler’s theorem:
𝑄=

𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑄
𝐿+
𝐾
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐾

so that inserting the first order conditions,
(A2)
𝑝=

𝜇(𝑤𝐿 + 𝑟𝐾)
𝜇 𝑤𝐿 + 𝑟𝐾
𝜇𝑟 𝐾 𝛽 𝑤𝐿
= 𝜇∙𝑐 =
=
( ) (
+ 1)
𝑄
𝐴 (𝐿𝛽 𝐾 1−𝛽 ) 𝐴 𝐿
𝑟𝐾

where c is the average unit cost, implying that 𝜇 =

𝑝
𝑐

𝑌

= 𝑐∙𝑄 is the average markup. From the

first order conditions,
(A3)
𝐾 1−𝛽𝑤
=
.
𝐿
𝛽 𝑟
Substituting (A2) and (A3) into the log of (A1) and defining 𝜔 ≡

ln 𝐴
𝜇

+ ln 𝑑,

(A4)
𝑙 = 𝑓 1 (𝜖) + 𝜖 ∙ 𝜔 − (𝜖 − 1)𝑓 2 (𝛽) + ln 𝛽 − ln
𝑓 1 (𝜖) = −𝜖 (ln 𝑟 + ln
𝑓 2 (𝛽) = 𝛽 ln

𝑤
𝑟

𝜖
)
𝜖−1

1−𝛽𝑤
− ln(1 − 𝛽).
𝛽 𝑟
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